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The paper tests three hypotheses concerning foreign equity investment in the presence of liquidity
risk. First, the FDI-to-FPI price differential is negatively related to liquidity risk (the "Price Discount
Hypothesis"). The idea is that market participants do not know whether the FDI investor liquidates
a firm because of an idiosyncratic liquidity shock, or because, as an informed investor, the firm is
hit by a productivity shock. Second, the FDI-to-FPI composition of foreign equity investment skews
towards FPI, if investors are expected to experience liquidity shortage in the future (the "Equity-Composition
Hypothesis"). The idea is that because direct investments are more costly to liquidate, due to the price
discount, the more severe is the expected liquidity shock, the smaller is the FDI-to-FPI ratio. Third,
the FDI-to-FPI composition of foreign equity flows skews towards FDI, the larger are past FDI-to-FPI
stocks (the "Strategic Complementarity Hypothesis"). The idea is that high liquidity need investors
generate a positive information-externality for low liquidity need investors among investors who choose
FDI, and further increases in the number of FDI investors comes from mainly high liquidity need investors.
Such an increase reinforces the information externality, thereby lowering the FDI-to-FPI price discount,
creating further incentives for investors to choose FDI. 
The paper brings these hypotheses to country level data consisting of a large set of developed and
developing countries over the period 1970 to 2004. The evidence gives strong support to the hypotheses.
To test the hypothesis, we apply also a dynamic panel model to examine the variation of FPI relative
to FDI for source and host countries from 1985 to 2004. Country-wide sales of external assets are
used as a proxy for liquidity problems. We estimate the determinants of liquidity problems, and then
test the effect of expected liquidity problems on stock prices, the ratio of FPI to FDI and gross flows
of FDI and FPI. We find strong support for the hypotheses: greater expected liquidity problems increase
the price discount, have a significant positive effect on gross flows of FPI, negative effect on gross













Liberalization of international capital markets gave rise to large amounts of international equity
￿ ows in recent years. These ￿ ows seem to have had a major impact on the cost of capital, on the
volatility of capital markets, and even on economic growth.1 In assessing the costs and bene￿ts of
the globalization of international equity markets, it is important to take account of the composition
of international equity ￿ ows. These ￿ ows generally take two forms: Foreign Direct Investments
(FDI) ￿ that usually involve a control position by the foreign investor ￿ and Foreign Portfolio
Investments (FPI) ￿that do not involve a control position. It is well known that these two forms of
investment generate very di⁄erent implications for the stability of international capital markets and
of host countries. It is claimed that FPI investors usually rush to liquidate their investments during
￿nancial crises, whereas FDI is more resilient and thus contributes to the stability of investment in
the host country (see: Frankel and Rose, 1996; Lipsey, 2001; and Sarno and Taylor, 1999).
Despite the importance of the distinction between FDI and FPI, not much is known about the
factors that guide the choice of international investors between them. Traditionally, Multinationals
engaged in FDI, while collective investment funds￿including private equity funds, mutual funds
and hedge funds ￿engaged in FPI. In such a world, investors seeking international exposure had to
choose between investing in multinationals or in investment funds. This choice in￿ uenced in turn
the composition of equity ￿ ows between FDI and FPI. More recently, the choice between FDI and
FPI has become even more direct, as collective investment funds became sources of FDI and started
competing with traditional multinationals in acquiring foreign companies.2 Our investigation has
strong implications for the future of FDI investments by collective investment funds. These funds
have expanded signi￿cantly in the past few years due to historically low interest rates, high liquidity
of investors and the good performance of private equity funds. However, events such as the recent
global ￿nancial crisis, and the resulting credit crunch, led to di¢ culties for the private equity funds
in conducting FDI investments.
The goal of the present paper is to shed empirical light on the factors that a⁄ect gross ￿ ows of
1See, for example, Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Errunza and Miller (2000), Henry (2000), Chari and Henry (2004),
and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005). Stulz (2005) reviews the development of ￿nancial globalization and its
limitations.
2According to the 2006 World Investment Report, collective investment funds have become growing sources of
FDI. These funds raised an amount of $261 billion in 2005 from institutional investors, such as banks, pension funds
and insurance companies. About half of the funds raised were then used towards FDI. Moreover, their main type
of FDI, cross-border M&As, reached $135 billion and accounted for as much as 19% of total cross-border M&As in
2005.
Both forms of equity ￿ ows were downscaled during the the 2008-9 global ￿nancial crisis.
1FDI and FPI at a bilateral country level.3. The anticipation of a future increase in liquidity risk at
the source and the host countries a⁄ect the choice between FDI and FPI ￿ ows. The basic idea is
that there is an e¢ ciency-information trade-o⁄ between FDI and FPI. On the one hand FDI run
project yield an expected higher payo⁄, because the investment decisions are more e¢ cient due to
a narrowing of the information gap between ownership and management. But, on the other hand,
FDI investments are illiquid and more di¢ cult to sell before they mature, and thus FPI investments
become more desirable in the face of expected liquidity needs. This hypothesis is based on Goldstein
and Razin (2006) and Kirabaeva (2009). In these models, FDI investors are more informed than
FPI investors about the prospects of the ￿rms they invest in. This information enables direct
investors to manage their projects more e¢ ciently. The informational advantage, however, comes
at a cost. If investors need to sell their investments before maturity because of liquidity shocks, the
price they get is typically lower when buyers know that the seller has more information about the
fundamentals of the investment project. A key implication of the model is that the choice between
FDI and FPI is linked to the likelihood with which investors expect to get a liquidity shock. High
liquidity risk investors tend to invest in the form of portfolio investment, whereas low liquidity risk
investors tend to invest in the form of direct investment in a separating equilibrium. The "lemons"
4 problem faced by FDI investors who prematurely liquidate their project is however lessened when
future liquidity risks increase if relatively more investors choose the FDI form for their foreign
investment.
The paper takes key implications from the e¢ ciency-information theory to the data. We use
across the board liquidation of external assets as an indicator of aggregate liquidity problems. Our
measures of FDI and FPI are based on source countries￿stocks of external assets as compiled by
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Using a sample of 65 countries between 1985 and 2004, we ￿rst
estimate the determinants of expected liquidity needs. Then, we examine the e⁄ect of predicted
future liquidity events on the choice of a source country between FDI and FPI and on the FDI to
FPI price di⁄erential.
3Goldstein, Razin, and Tong (2007) ￿rst developed the approach of estimating the e⁄ect of liquidity risk on the
the composition of equity out￿ ows.
4Goldstein and Razin (2006) assumed that only idiosyncratic liquidity shocks exist. Assume now that an aggregate
liquidity shock triggered the idio syncratic shocks. This captures the idea that individual investors are forced to sell
their investments early particularly at times when there are aggregate liquidity problems which depress the market
values of debt collaterals. In those times, some individual investors have deeper pockets than others, and thus are
less exposed to the liquidity issues. Thus, once an aggregate liquidity shock occurs, some individual investors will
need to sell, but they will get a low price because buyers do not know if they have deep pockets, and sell because
of adverse information on the pro￿tability of their investment projects, or because they are truly a⁄ected by the
aggregate liquidity crisis.
2Our paper is related to the vast empirical literature on international equity ￿ ows. Several
papers study the determinants of FDI (including cross-border M&As) emphasizing factors such as
wealth and credit constraints, governance, mispricing, and ￿re sales. They include: Froot and Stein
(1991), Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002), Rossi and Volpin (2004), Aguiar and Gopinath (2005),
Albuquerque, Loayza, and Serven (2005), and Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2009). Other papers
(e.g., Gri¢ n, Nardari, and Stulz, 2004; Gelos and Wei, 2005; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; and Leuz,
Lins, and Warnock, 2009) study the determinants of FPI. Albuquerque (2003) studies the ratio of
FDI to FPI at the level of the host country, emphasizing expropriation risk. None of these papers
examines the e⁄ect of potential liquidity crises or considers the determinants of the composition
between FDI and FPI at the level of the source country. The paper follows preliminary study by
Goldstein, Razin, and Tong (2009).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the adverse selection
theory of a choice between FPI and FDI. Section 3 put forth the main hypotheses that we take to
the data. In Section 3, we describe the data. The econometric model and its various speci￿cations
are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we present measures of liquidity risk. Section 6 presents
the results of the empirical analysis and Section 7 concludes.
2 Adverse-Selection Based Theory
The theory which we test of an investor choice between FPI and FDI is based on an e¢ ciency-
information trade-o⁄. FDI investors get more e¢ cient outcomes than FPI investors under their
direct control over management, due to having better information about the ￿rm￿ s productivity;
which allows them to make informed investment and management decisions. However, the better
information mires FDI investors with a ￿lemons￿ problem: if an investment project has to be
liquidated prematurely, market participants would not know whether the ￿rm is sold because of
exogenously determined liquidity needs, or because the more informed investors ￿nd some negative
aspects about the asset productivity. The consequence is that market will place a discount on
a direct-investor liquidated assets to be sold below assets that portfolio investors liquidate. The
magnitude of the discount depends on market￿ s perception about the likelihood of a liquidity shock.
Theory predicts that the composition of foreign equity investment entails relatively more FPI
and less FDI if this country is expected to experience aggregate liquidity problems. The idea is
3that direct investments are more costly to liquidate. Hence, expecting greater liquidity needs in
the future, investors tend to tilt their investments towards the liquid asset, which is a portfolio
investment. This hypothesis does not depend on the source of illiquidity faced by direct investors.
Goldstein and Razin (2006) and Kirabaeva (2009) derive the illiquidity situation endogenously,
as a result of asymmetric information. Key feature is that foreign direct investors are able to acquire
better information about the fundamentals of the ￿rms that they hold due to their ownership
position (see Appendix). This provides an advantage to FDI relative to FPI when it comes to
managing the investment. But, when they need to sell due to a liquidity need, FDI investors face
a "lemons" problem due to their superior information and must sell at a discount. At this stage
aggregate shocks to either country A, or Country B, are added on top of the idiosyncratic shocks.
This captures the idea that liquidity shocks to individual investors are triggered by some country
speci￿c aggregate liquidity shock. Individual investors are forced to sell their investments early
particularly at times when there are aggregate liquidity problems. In those times, some individual
investors have deeper pockets than others, and thus are less exposed to the liquidity issues. Thus,
once an aggregate liquidity shock occurs, some individual investors will need to sell, but they will
get a low price because buyers do not know if they have deep pockets and sell because of adverse
information or because they are truly a⁄ected by the aggregate liquidity crisis.
An equilibrium property is that the composition of current ￿ ows depends on the composition
of past ￿ ows. In a pooled equilibrium, where FDI investors are heterogeneous with regard to their
idiosyncratic future liquidity needs, low- liquidity needs investors generate negative externalities
on the high-liquidity needs investors. Market naturally evaluates the liquidity risk as an average
between the high and the low probabilities of the shocks to liquidity. If a high-liquidity needs
investor has to liquidate her investment, market perceives that the premature sale has to with
joint occurrences of some idiosyncratic low productivity liquidity realizations. Common knowledge
concerning the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity and liquidity shocks help the market to
evaluate the liquidated assets; imperfectly, because of the information asymmetry. Thus FDI asset
is sold at a discount.
Another implication arises from the existence of information-based externality. Ideally, if the
high-liquidity needs investors, could somehow separate themselves from the low-liquidity needs in-
vestors, the former can sell their assets at a better price. But this is not possible in the pooling
equilibrium. This means that high liquidity need investors generate a positive information-exterality
over low liquidity need investors among direct investors. Because an increase in the number of FDI
4investors comes from high liquidity need investors, which reinforces such exteranlity, thereby low-
ering the price discount, and creating incentives for even more investors to choose to become direct
investors rather than FPI investors. Pooling equilibrium is therefore characterized by strategic
complementarity. A dynamic implication is that the larger is the past and present share of FDI
￿ ows, the larger will also be the future share of FDI ￿ ows.
3 Testable Hypotheses
We bring to the data the following hypotheses which are formulated from previous section (adverse-
selection) theory.
1. "Price Discount Hypothesis". The ratio of FDI price to FPI price is negatively a⁄ected by
liquidity risk. The idea is that a market participant does not know whether the FDI investor
liquidates the ￿rm because of an idiosyncratic liquidity shock, or because she has some negative
information about the ￿rm productivity.
2. "Equity-Composition Hypothesis". The ratio of (gross) ￿ ows of FPI to (gross) ￿ ows of FDI
increases if investors expect more severe liquidity problems. The idea is that direct investments are
more costly to liquidate, because when liquidated they are sold at a discount. Hence, expecting
greater aggregate liquidity needs in the future, investors tend to tilt their investments towards a
relatively more liquid asset, which is a portfolio investment.
3. "Strategic Complementarity Hypothesis". The e⁄ect of greater liquidity risk on gross ou￿ ows
and out￿ ows of FDI, relative to FPI depends on the initial number of FDI investors, relative to
the number of FPI investors. The idea is that high liquidity need investors generate a positive
information-exterality over low liquidity need investors among direct investors. Because an increase
in the number of FDI investors comes from high liquidity need investors, which reinforces such
exteranlity, thereby lowering the price discount and creating incentives for even more investors to
choose to become direct investors rather than FPI investors.
4 Data
A key variable of interest is the ratio between the assets that a country holds as FPI and the assets
that it holds as FDI. To measure this ratio, we use the recently available data on a country￿ s external
assets and liabilities, as compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
5(2007) assemble a comprehensive dataset on the external assets and liabilities of 140 developed and
developing countries for the period 1970￿ 2004. They distinguish four types of international assets:
foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio (equity) investment, o¢ cial reserves, and external debt.
The convention for distinguishing between direct investment and portfolio investment is to see
whether the ownership of shares of companies is above or below 10%. If it is above the threshold,
then it is classi￿ed as direct investment.5
For most countries, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) use as a benchmark the o¢ cial International
Investment Position (IIP) estimates. However, only very few countries have consistently reported
their IIP over the period 1970￿ 2004, with the majority of countries starting to report in the early
1990s. For earlier years, they then work backwards with data on capital ￿ ows, together with cal-
culations for capital gains and losses, to generate estimates for stock positions. In their estimation,
due to cross-country variation in the reliability of the data, they also employ a range of valuation
techniques to obtain the most appropriate series for each country. Particularly, they use similar
valuation adjustment for FPI and FDI. In our estimation, we use the data from 1985 till 2004 as
the sample period.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000) dataset consists of 140 economies from 1970 ￿2004, and the
stock of international assets and liabilities are divided into four types: foreign direct investment,
portfolio equity investment, o¢ cial reserves, and external debt . The dataset contains more data
on developed economies than developing ones due to data availability. This paper will use the
data from 1985 to 2004 as the sample period. The outward FDI and FPI into the host countries
are measured using the data of the host countries￿stock of FDI liabilities and equity liabilities,
respectively. The other macroeconomic variables, which will serve as controls in the regressions,
are from WDI.
Our sample includes both developed and developing countries as source countries for outward
FPI and FDI. New sources of FDI are emerging among developing and transition economies, as
multinationals from these economies become major regional - or sometimes even global - players. It
seems that the new global links these multinationals are forging will have far-reaching repercussions
in shaping the world economic landscape of the coming decades (UNCTAD: World Investment
5Arguably, there is the problem of "borderline" cases where it is di¢ cult to classify an investment as FDI or FPI.
In countries where FPI is liberalized, a portfolio investor might buy more than 10 percent of the shares of companies
without having a "lasting interest" to control the companies. And yet that investor￿ s investment can be classi￿ed as
FDI. Using the control interest as a dividing line, there are circumstances where FDI can turn into FPI through the
dilution of ownership and loss of control. Conversely, FPI can be transformed into FDI, if the investor decides to
have a management interest in the companies whose assets he had earlier purchased as FPI.
6Report 2006). Table 1 lists the countries covered in the sample from 1985 till 2004, and their mean
ratio of FPI to FDI.6 Table 2 provides summary statistics.
A key explanatory variable measures the extent of liquidity problems in the source country. As
we explain in the next section, we estimate this variable using data on annual ￿ ows in external
assets. This data is collected from the IMF￿ s Balance of Payments dataset.7 Finally, in the following
empirical sections, we will also use a few macroeconomic variables as our explanatory variables.
These macroeconomic data, such as GDP, current account balance, exchange rates, and trade
openness, are collected from the IMF￿ s World Economic Outlook database, which has historical
cross-country coverage. Some other variables, such as political risk and opacity, are collected from
various datasets and will be described in more details when introduced.
5 Measures of Liquidity Crises
We follow Goldstein, Razin, and Tong (2007) and de￿ne a liquidity crisis as an incident of the nega-
tive purchase of external assets, which is composed of foreign exchange reserves, direct investments,
portfolio investments, and other assets. The rationale is that when a country is in need of liquidity,
it would sell o⁄its less liquid assets to get cash or more liquid holdings. Two measures will be used
to proxy the liquidity crisis. The ￿rst measure is the truncated liquidity crisis severity variable,
which is equal to the country￿ s sales of external assets over its total assets in the next period if
such sales is positive (if the liquidity crisis in the next period is present) and zero otherwise. This
measure will also capture the magnitude of the liquidity crisis. The second measure is the liquidity
crisis binary variable, which is equal to one if the purchase of the external assets in the next period
becomes negative and zero otherwise.
6 Estimating the e⁄ect of the Severity of Liquidity Shocks
The crux of our theory is that if a country expects greater liquidity problems in the future it will
increase the share of FPI relative to FDI. We use the variable Et [Severityit+1] to proxy for the
severity of expected liquidity shocks, as perceived in period t, and investigate how it a⁄ects the
6Sample coverage in the following econometric analyses varies a bit, depending on whether countries have data
on various explanatory variables. Table 1 is for the sample when countries have data available for the estimations in
Table 3.
7This data does not account for changes in valuation, and therefore allows us to capture the notion of the quantity
of investment liquidations in our model.
7FPI/FDI ratio for source countries. The empirical analysis has two stages. First, to estimate the
expected severity of liquidity shocks, we run the following regression:
Severityi;t+1 = ￿Xit + ￿Zit + ￿t+1 + &i + ￿it+1: (1)
Then, we use the expected value of Severityi;t+1, estimated from (1), as our main explanatory
variable for the ratio of FPI to FDI as well as their levels in period t.
The vector Zit is motivated by the literature on ￿nancial crises (e.g., Frankel and Rose, 1996).
It includes source country political risk index, current account surplus over GDP, and a country￿ s
external debt over total assets. Political risk index, from the International Country Risk Guide,
is based mainly on government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment pro￿le, internal
con￿ ict, external con￿ ict, corruption, and bureaucracy quality.8 It has been linked to ￿nancial
crises in earlier literature, with higher political risk making the economy vulnerable to capital ￿ ow
reversals (e.g. Gelos and Wei (2005), and Broner, Gelos and Reinhart (2006)). Identifying the
system in (1) and (??) requires the exclusion restriction to be satis￿ed. That is, the variables in Zit
should have no e⁄ect on FPI=(FPI+FDI) except for the indirect e⁄ect via the expected liquidity
shock. Indeed, our theory does not suggest the inclusion of political risk, current account surplus,
and external debt as direct controls in (??), and we are not aware of other models that suggest
such a link. In earlier literature, political risk at the host country has been tied to its level of FDI
due to con￿scation considerations (Albuquerque (2003) and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych
(2008)). The link between FDI and these con￿scation considerations, however, does not apply to
the source country. Another potential concern is that the current account balance may indirectly
a⁄ect the FPI/FDI composition through a⁄ecting the exchange rate, which may then generate
some wealth e⁄ect and in￿ uence FDI and FPI asymmetrically as in Froot and Stein (1991).9 To
alleviate this concern, we include a control variable for the real exchange rate in equation (??).10
8See http://www.prsgroup.com/commonhtml/ methods.html# _International_Country_Risk.
9The Froot and Stein (1991) model operates via a wealth e⁄ect in the host country. Because of frictions in control
that exist in FDI but not in FPI, wealth is important only for FDI. Thus a rise in host-country wealth, from the
appreciation of its real exchange rate, will increase its FDI in￿ ow, while having no impact on its FPI receipts. One
could potentially extend their model to source countries with the prediction that real exchange rate appreciation may
increase FDI out￿ ow, relative to FPI out￿ ow.
10Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2009) also argue that higher source country￿ s wealth could signi￿cantly boost FDI
out￿ ow, due to cheap ￿nancial capital. They use the market to book ratio in the US stock market as a proxy of
cheap capital for US ￿rms. As the data on exchange rate has more country coverage than the market/book ratio, we
will then use the real exchange rate also to proxy for the wealth of source country.
86.1 Estimating the E⁄ect of a Liquidity Threshold
We also employ an alternative model ￿the threshold model. The idea here is that a liquidity
shock has a strong impact on the FPI/FDI composition only after it reaches a certain thresh-
old, and becomes a ￿liquidity crisis￿ . In this model, we start by estimating the following Probit
equation:




1 if Severityi;t+1 > 0
0 if Severityi;t+1 ￿ 0
; (2)
where Severityi;t+1is a function of independent variables as speci￿ed in equation (1). Here, we
de￿ne a liquidity crisis as an episode of negative purchase of external assets, which has a frequency
of 13% in our sample. Table 8 lists the countries and years when there is a liquidity crisis, according
to this de￿nition. It shows that besides developing countries, some developed economies, such as
Denmark, Japan, New Zealand and Spain, also experienced liquidity crises in our sample period.
After estimating the liquidity crisis dummy, we use it as an explanatory variable in the second-
stage equations.
6.2 Estimating the E⁄ects of Liquidity Risk on the FDI to FPI Price Discount
The price of FDI is estimated as follow. Because an FDI is composed of both the holdings of stocks
(more than 10% of the total stockholding) and Green￿eld investment, the composite price of FDI
is calculated as follow.
PFDIi;t = !Pstocks
i;t + (1 ￿ !)P
greenfield
i;t (3)
where ! is the FDI equity in￿ ows over the total FDI in￿ ows, which re￿ ects the weight of the
equity holding portion of FDI to the total FDI in￿ ows (the data of both the FDI equity in￿ ows an
the total FDI in￿ ows are from the UNCTAD WID Country Pro￿le ).
The stock market index of the host country will be used to proxy the price of FDI equity holding,
Pstocks
i;t .
The price of Green￿eld investment in the host country, P
greenfield
i;t , will be estimated using the
following formula of the unit price of investment, which was speci￿ed in del Rio (2004).
P
greenfield
i;t = pi ￿ [(ci ￿ cgdp)=(ki ￿ rgdpl)]
The variable pi is the PPP price level of investment. The variable cgdp is the GDP per capita
at world price, and ci is the investment share of cgdp. Similarly, the variable rgdpl is the GDP
9per capita at constant world price using Laspeyres price index, and ki is the investment share of
rgdpl. The term [(ci*cgdp)/(ki*rgdpl)] serves as the implicit de￿ ator of investment (the data of
calculating PgreenfieldisfromPennWorldTabledatabaseoftheUniversityofPennsylvania):
As for the price of FPI, the stock market index is used as a proxy for the composite price of
various stocks in host countries. Nevertheless, the caveat of this approach is that the method of
calculating the stock market index varies among di⁄erent countries. The data of the stock market
index of various countries are obtained from the Economist Intelligence Unit database.
The theoretical model also predicts that as the liquidity shock probability increases, more people
are selling and less are buying both FDI and FPI. Thus, the prices of both will decline. On the
other hand, the higher liquidity shock probability reduces adverse selection problem. As a result,
the price of FDI can actually increase.




i;t) = ￿Wi;t + ￿0(LiquidityCrisisi;t+1) + ￿i;t (4)
The term Wi;t includes the log of GDP, the log of GDP per capita (constant price), and in￿ ation.
The liquidity crisis variable refers to both the severity and the binary measures of liquidity crisis,
which will be instrumented on the factors that a⁄ect the possibility that the country may experience
a liquidity crisis. The excluded instrumental variables include the current account balance to GDP,
the government budget balance to GDP, the percentage of short-term debt, and the measures of
political and ￿nancial risks from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The current account
balance and the government budget balance indicate the country￿ s need of external ￿nancing,
whereas the percentage of short-term debt signals the country￿ s need of liquidity. The political and
￿nancial risks are associated with the creditworthiness of a country (Haque et al. (1997)). According
to the price discount hypothesis, the coe¢ cient ￿0 should be negative due to the informational
discount on the price of FDI.
In addition to the price discount hypothesis, the strategic complementarity hypothesis also
predicts that if a country initially has a higher proportion of direct investors, the informational






10The term (FDI=AllInwardCapital)i;t￿1 is used as a proxy of the proportion of direct investors
(all inward capital includes inward FDI, FPI, debt, and derivatives). According to thestrategic
complementarity hypothesis, the coe¢ cient ￿1 should be positive due to the mitigation of the
informational discount on the price of FDI.
6.3 Estimating the E⁄ects of Liquidity Risk on the Composition of Outward
FPI to FDI
Reduced form econometric models will be employed to explore whether the hypothesized mech-
anisms of international capital movements hold in the data. First, this paper will explore the
relationship between liquidity crisis and the capital ￿ ows out of the source countries. Unlike Gold-
stein, Razin, and Tong (2007), which regressed the ratio of FPI to FDI out￿ ows on the predicted
probability of the liquidity crisis, this paper will regress the FPI to FDI out￿ ows on the instru-
mented liquidity crisis measures. The e⁄ect of the liquidity crisis on the ratio of FPI to FDI out￿ ows
will be investigated using the following set-up:
ln(FPI=FDI)
out
i;t = ￿Xi;t + ￿0(LiquidityCrisisi;t+1) + ￿yeart + ￿i + ￿i;t(6)
where the liquidity crisis variable will be instrumented as previously described.
The term LiquidityCrisisi;t+1 is measured as the negative net annual purchase of external
assets ￿which include FDI, FPI, other investments and foreign reserves ￿in country i in period
t+1. We normalize these ￿ ows by the stock of total external assets of country i at time t. Xit are
variables that a⁄ect both the liquidity shock and the ratio of FPI to FDI. Zit are variables excluded
from equation (??), ￿t+1 are year ￿xed e⁄ects and &i stand for country e⁄ects. In (??), we take
the log of the FPI/(FPI+FDI) to reduce the impact of extreme values. In this equation, vt stands
for time ￿xed e⁄ects, ui stands for country e⁄ects. "it and ￿it+1 are i.i.d. residuals.
Our selection of control variables Xit is motivated by Faria et al. (2007), who examine the
determinants of the composition of a country￿ s external liabilities. They consider a set of explana-
tory variables, including country size, economic development level, trade openness and ￿nancial
reform. They ￿nd that only country size has some explanatory power on the distribution of equity
11liabilities between direct investment and portfolio equity. As little work has empirically examined
the composition of external assets, we use the control variables in Faria et al. (2007) as our starting
point. First, we include two variables ￿the log of the population and the log of GDP per capita
in constant US dollars ￿to capture market size and the level of economic development. We then
also include trade openness, as measured by imports plus exports over GDP, to control for the
connection between trade and FDI. We further include the lagged real exchange rate to capture the
wealth e⁄ect on capital ￿ ows (see Froot and Stein (1991)). Table 2 provides summary statistics of
these variables.
Because the composition of FPI and FDI in the last period may in￿ uence the composition in
the current period due to portfolio rebalancing (Goldstein, Razin, and Tong (2007)), the model




i;t = ￿Xi;t +￿0(LiquidityCrisisi;t+1)+￿ln(FPI=FDI)
out
i;t￿1 +￿yeart +￿i +￿i;t(7)
The above model will be estimated using the Arellano-Bond dynamic GMM approach because
it will take care of the endogeneity problem when the lag of FPI/FDI is correlated with the error
term.
However, if the number of instruments is larger than the number of groups of data in the
dynamic panel model with instrumental variables, it is possible that the problem of too many
instruments may occur. If it does, the instruments, although each of them are valid, might be
collectively invalid in the ￿nite samples because they over ￿t the endogenous variable and will also
weaken the reliability of the Hansen test for instrument validity (Roodman (2008)). Therefore, the
number of instruments included in the dynamic panel models may be less than those included in
the ￿xed e⁄ects models .
Next, the e⁄ects of the liquidity risk as well as the initial proportion of direct investment on the











i;t￿1 + ￿yeart + ￿i + ￿i;t(9)
The coe¢ cient before the liquidity crisis variable will capture the main e⁄ect of liquidity risk,
since the immediate reaction of investors facing liquidity shock would be to shift towards more
liquid asset. The sign of this coe¢ cient is predicted to be positive. In addition to the main e⁄ect
of the liquidity risk, the interaction term between the liquidity risk and the proportion of inward
FDI to all inward capital is also included to capture the e⁄ect of the mitigated adverse selection
problem. As predicted by the strategic complementary hypothesis, the higher proportion of direct
investors will lower the informational discount on the price of FDI and hence increase the outward
FDI. Thus, the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is expected to be negative. The set of controls
will be the same as in the previous regression.
6.4 Estimating the E⁄ects of Liquidity Risk on the Gross Flows and the Net
Flows of FDI and FPI
The regressions previously run on the compositions of outward FPI to FDI will be run again on
the values of FPI and FDI to observe whether the results are consistent with one another.
Finally, to capture the in￿ uence of liquidity crisis on the net amount of each type of international
capital, the two regressions above will be run again using the net FPI and the net FDI as dependent
variables.
13(FPI out￿FPIin)i;t = ￿Xi;t+￿0(InstrumentedLiquidityCrisisi;t+1)+￿1(Instrumented(FDI=AllInwardCapital)i;t￿1￿
(LiquidityCrisisi;t+1)) + ￿2(FDI=AllInwardCapital)i;t￿1 + ￿yeart + ￿i + ￿i;t(10)
(FDI out￿FDIin)i;t = ￿Xi;t+￿0(InstrumentedLiquidityCrisisi;t+1)+￿1(Instrumented(FDI=AllInwardCapital)i;t￿1￿
(LiquidityCrisisi;t+1)) + ￿2(FDI=AllInwardCapital)i;t￿1 + ￿yeart + ￿i + ￿i;t(11)
The main e⁄ect of the instrumented liquidity crisis variable will in￿ uence the net amount of
each type of capital via both the outward and inward directions, while the main e⁄ect of the initial
proportion of FDI and the interaction term will a⁄ect the net FPI and FDI mainly through the
inward direction.
Finally, we consider another speci￿cation for (??), where the lagged FPI/FDI can a⁄ect the
current FPI/FDI. Hence, we estimate:
ln(FPI=(FPI + FDI))it = ￿ln(FPI=FDI)i;t￿1+￿Xit+￿Et [Severityit+1]++￿ ln(FPI=(FPI + FDI))it￿1+vt+ui+"it:
(12)
There is a complication in estimating equation (12). That is, if "it is not i.i.d but serially-correlated,
then ln(FPI=FDI)i;t￿1 will be correlated with "it and thus create an endogeneity problem. To
correct this problem, we then use the Arellano-Bond dynamic GMM approach to estimate equation
(12).
147 Results
7.1 E⁄ects of Liquidity Risk on Stock Prices
The results of the regression of the ratio of FDI price to FPI price are presented in Table 3. Column
1 reveals the results of regressing the FDI to FPI price ratio on the instrumented liquidity crisis
severity measure, while column 2 shows the results of regressing the price ratio on the instrumented
liquidity crisis binary variable. The overall results are consistent with the price discount hypothesis
regardless of the measures of liquidity crisis used in the regressions. The higher liquidity risk
negatively a⁄ects the ratio of FDI price to FPI price. This mirrored the informational discount
because market participants do not know whether an FDI is sold due to liquidity shock or due to
adverse productivity realization. In addition, the results showed that the higher GDP per capita
(constant price) is associated with the increase in the ratio of FDI price to FPI price.
Nevertheless, when taking into account the initial portion of direct investors in the market, the
regression results reveal that adverse selection problem is mitigated. Table 4 illustrated the results
of regressing the ratio of FDI price to FPI price on the instrumented liquidity crisis variables and
the interaction term between liquidity crisis and the initial portion of FDI investors. The negative
coe¢ cients of the instrumented liquidity crisis measures remained in line with the price discount
hypothesis. However, the positive coe¢ cients of the interaction term indicate that with higher
initial portion of FDI investors, the higher liquidity risk can actually raise the ratio of FDI price
to FPI price. This is consistent with the strategic complementarity hypothesis, which infers that
the higher initial portion of direct investors will increase the probability that FDIs are sold due to
liquidity shock, lowering the informational discount on the price of FDI.
7.2 E⁄ect of Liquidity Risk on the Composition of Equity Flows
Table 5 presents the regression results of the ratio between outward FPI and FDI. Columns 1 and
2 report the ￿xed e⁄ects estimations, while columns 3 and 4 present the Arellano-Bond dynamic
panel estimations. The results of all the regressions in this part point toward the same direction
The empirical results in this part appear to be in line with the predictionsin Goldstein and Razin
(2006) and the empirical results in Goldstein, Razin, and Tong (2007). The higher probability of
liquidity crisis would lead to the higher outward FPI relative to the outward FDI, which supports
the asset-liquidity hypothesis. The reason is that the higher liquidity risk in the source country
increases the probability that investors from the source country may face liquidity shock and hence
15would not hold their investment until maturity. If that is the case, then those investors would lose
from holding FDI since the selling price of FDI before maturity is lower than that of FPI due to
information asymmetry. Such conjecture is supported by the positive coe¢ cient of the instrumented
liquidity crisis variable in the regressions of the outward FPI to the outward FDI. This result holds
when using the liquidity crisis severity as well as the liquidity crisis dummy as the instrumented
explanatory variables.
While the asset-liquidity hypothesis infers that the higher liquidity risk will result in the higher
ratio of outward FPI to FDI, the strategic complementarity hypothesis indicates that the higher
liquidity risk may in turn decrease the ratio of outward FPI to FDI if a country initially has
high proportion of direct investors. In order to investigate whether the strategic complementarity
hypothesis is consistent with the data, the ratio of outward FPI to FDI will be regressed on both the
instrumented liquidity crisis variable and the interaction term between the instrumented liquidity
crisis and the initial portion of direct investment (as well as other control variables). The results
of the ￿xed e⁄ects and the dynamic panel regressions are shown in Tables 6 and 7, respectively.
Only the dynamic panel results support the strategic complementarity hypothesis (neither the
instrumented liquidity crisis nor the interaction term are signi￿cant in the ￿xed e⁄ects regressions).
In the dynamic panel regressions, the positive coe¢ cient of the instrumented liquidity crisis still
con￿rms that the higher liquidity risk is associated with the higher outward FPI relative to the
outward FDI. On the other hand, the negative coe¢ cient of the interaction term indicated that
if a country has a higher initial portion of direct investment, the increase in liquidity risk will
result in the lower ratio of outward FPI to FDI. This coincides with the mechanism that the
higher proportion of direct investment will mitigate the information asymmetry problem and thus
the information discount on the price of FDI, reducing the lost in selling FDI before maturity.
Therefore, when facing the higher liquidity risk, investors would not have to reduce the holdings of
FDI as much as before.
To examine the validity of the dynamic panel estimations, the existence of unit root in the data of
FPI to FDI ratio as well as the presence of higher order auto-correlations must be determined. The
coe¢ cients of the lagged FPI to FDI in columns 3 and 4 are lower than 1, respectively, indicating
that there is no unit root. Also, the Arrelano-Bond tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no
auto-correlation in the second, third, and fourth orders. Therefore, the results of the dynamic panel
regressions are valid and support the theoretical predictions.
167.3 E⁄ects of Liquidity Risk on Gross Flows and Net Flows of FDI and FPI
To explore the mechanism of the liquidity crisis and the outward international capital more thor-
oughly, the regression models must also be estimated separately for the levels of the outward FDI
and the outward FPI. Both the ￿xed e⁄ects and the dynamic panel estimations for the level of
the outward FDI portray the same picture. The results, which are presented in Table 8, indicate
that after controlling for the price and other factors (including the lagged quantity in the case of
dynamic panel estimation), the higher probability of liquidity crisis still has a signi￿cant negative
e⁄ect on the outward FDI, which is in line with the theoretical prediction that investors from the
source country would want to hold less FDI when facing a higher probability of liquidity shock.
However,the coe¢ cients of the instrumented liquidity crisis are not signi￿cant in the regressions
of the outward FPI except for the dynamic panel regression of the level of FPI using the severity
measure of liquidity crisis as a regressor (see Table 9). Hence, it appears in the data that the
liquidity crisis probability a⁄ects the composition of outward international capital mainly through
the channel of outward FDI.
The regressions of the net FDI (outward FDI less inward FDI), which are presented in Table
10, show consistent results throughout all speci￿cations of liquidity crisis measures. Countries with
higher liquidity risk will have the higher net FDI. On the other hand, if the country has a large
proportion of inward direct investment, the higher liquidity risk will be associated with the lower
netFDI. In addition, countries with higher initial proportion of inward direct investment are the
ones that attract more inward FDI, decreasing the net FDI.
When examining the e⁄ects of liquidity risk on the net FPI using the liquidity crisis severity
measure, the results (in Table 11) show that countries with higher liquidity risk will have the
higher net FPI. However, the interaction term indicated with a large proportion of inward direct
investment, the higher liquidity risk will be associated with the lower net FPI. The main e⁄ect
of the proportion of the initial inward direct investment signaled that countries with higher initial
proportion of inward direct investment could be the ones with more inward FDI and less inward FPI,
increasing the net FPI. Nonetheless, only the interaction term remain signi￿cant when replacing
the liquidity crisis severity by the binary variable.
Overall, the ￿ndings about the e⁄ects of the liquidity risk on the prices, the compositions, and
the levels of FPI and FDI are consistent with one another and support the theoretical predictions.
The sale of assets in response to liquidity shock lowers the price of FDI relative to that of FPI,
17whereas the mitigation of the ￿ lemon￿problem helps pushing up the relative prices of FDI and
FPI. More importantly, because of informational discount on the price of FDI, the rise in liquidity
risk tends to reduce the holdings of FDI, thereby increasing the ratio of outward FPI and outward
FDI. Nevertheless, if the proportion of direct investors is higher, the reduced ￿lemon￿problem will
drive up the demand of FDI and thus decrease the FPI to FDI ratio.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how the fear of liquidity shocks guides international investors in choosing
between FPI and FDI. Our hypothesis is based on an information-e¢ ciency trade-o⁄ (Goldstein
and Razin (2006), Kirabaeva (2009)). FDI investors control the management of the ￿rms; whereas
FPI investors delegate decisions to managers. Consequently, direct investors are more informed
than portfolio investors about the prospects of projects. As a consequence of a better information
they are able to manage their projects, and invest in them, more e¢ ciently. However, if investors
need to liquidate investments, the price they can get will be lower whenever buyers know that
the seller is more informed.The paper tests three hypotheses concerning foreign equity investment
in the presence of liquidity risk. First, the FDI-to-FPI price di⁄erential is negatively related to
liquidity risk (the "Price Discount Hypothesis"). The idea is that market participants do not
know whether the FDI investor liquidates a ￿rm because of an idiosyncratic liquidity shock, or
because, as an informed invesor, the ￿rm is hit by a productivity shock. Second, the FDI-to-FPI
composition of foreign equity investment skews towards FPI, if investors are expected to experience
liquidity shortage in the future (the ""Equity-Composition Hypothesis"). The idea is that because
direct investments are more costly to liquidate, due to the price discount, the more severe is the
expected liquidity shock, the smaller is the FDI-to-FPI ratio. Third, the FDI-to-FPI composition
of foreign equity ￿ ows skews towards FDI, the larger are past FDI-to-FPI stocks (the "Strategic
Complementarity Hypothesis"). The idea is that high liquidity need investors generate a positive
information-exterality for low liquidity need investors among investors who choose FDI, and further
increases in the number of FDI investors comes from mainly high liquidity need investors. Such
an increase reinforces the information exteranlity, thereby lowering the FDI-to-FPI price discount,
creating further incentives for investors to choose FDI.The paper brings these hypotheses to country
level data consisting of a large set of developed and developing countries over the period 1970 to
2004. The evidence gives strong support to the hypotheses. To test the hypothesis, we apply also a
18dynamic panel model to examine the variation of FPI relative to FDI for source and host countries
from 1985 to 2004. Country-wide sales of external assets are used as a proxy for liquidity problems.
We estimate the determinants of liquidity problems, and then test the e⁄ect of expected liquidity
problems on stock prices, the ratio of FPI to FDI and gross ￿ ows of FDI and FPI. We ￿nd strong
support for the hypotheses: greater expected liquidity problems increase the price discount, have a
signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on gross ￿ ows of FPI, negative e⁄ect on gross ￿ ows of FPI, and positive
e⁄ect on the ratio between FPI and FDI.
9 Appendix: A Two-Country Model
19Applying the e¢ ciency-information trade-o⁄ concept in Goldstein and Razin (2006) small open
economy into a two-country framework, Kirabaeva (2009) models the behavior of FDI and FPI
investors in a two-country world, as follows. There are two countries (k ={A,B}), three periods
(t = 0, 1, 2), and a continuum [0,1] of foreign investors. In this model, there are two countries (k
={A,B}), three periods (t = 0, 1, 2), and a continuum [0,1] of foreign investors. Denote ￿ as the
proportion of investors living in country A and 1-￿ as those living in B. Each investor from country
k has a Diamond-Dybvig type of preference:
E[U k (C1;C2)] = ￿kE [u(C1)] + (1 ￿ ￿k)E [u(C2)]
where ￿k denotes the probability of liquidity shock in country k. Because there is no aggregate
uncertainty, ￿k is also a proportion of investors who face liquidity shock. Assume without the loss
of generality that country A has lower probability of liquidity shock than country B (￿A <￿B ).
In each period 1 and 2, each investor has a mean-variance type of preference:
E [u(Ct)] = E [Ct] + (￿=2)V ar[Ct]
Each investor is endowed with one unit of good in period zero, which can be consumed or
invested. There are two kinds of assets, safe asset or cash, in which 1 unit of investment would
yield the return of 1 every period, and a risky long-term investment project i in country k, in which
1 unit of investment in period zero yields the return of Ri
k in period two. The return Ri
k from
an investment project is equal to the idiosyncratic investment productivity with the mean Rk and
variance ￿2
k. The mean productivity Rk can also be interpreted as the productivity signal, and it
takes the value of Rkl with the probability of ￿k and Rkh with the probability of 1-￿k. Hence, the
expected productivity signal is equal to
E [Rk] = ￿kRkl + (1 ￿ ￿k)Rkh
At period zero, an investor could be a direct investor by investing the amount xi
dk (which is
equal to xi
k) directly in one project or he could become a portfolio investor investing the amount
xi
pk in each project for Nk projects (xi
pk = Nkxi
k). Because direct investors have control over the
management of the investment project while portfolio investors leave management in the hands of
agents, a direct investment will obtain higher management e¢ ciency than a portfolio investment.
Hence, the probability of low productivity for FDI is lower than that for FPI (￿dk <￿pk) and the
20expected return of FDI is higher than that of FDI.
Rdk = E [Rdk] = ￿dkRkl + (1 ￿ ￿dk)Rkh > Rpk = E [Rpk] = ￿pkRkl + (1 ￿ ￿pk)Rkh
The variances of the direct investment and portfolio investment are ￿2
k and ￿2
k=Nk, respectively.
At period one, the liquidity shock realizes. As a result, those who face liquidity shock, regardless
of whether they are direct or portfolio investors, must sell their assets in order to consume their
wealth within period one. The investments￿productivity realizations also occur at this period.
And because direct investors have controls over the project management, only them acquire the
information about the projects￿ productivity realization and would sell their investment if the
productivity turns out to be low. Therefore, when direct investments are sold in period one,
the market would not know whether they are sold because of liquidity need or because of low
productivity. This leads to adverse selection problem.
Denote ￿dk as the probability perceived by the market that a direct investor investing in country
k receives a liquidity shock. The market believes that a direct investment is sold because of liquidity
shock with the probability
￿dk
￿dk+(1￿￿dk)￿dk, and it perceives that the productivity realization of a
direct investment prematurely sold due to liquidity shock is high (Rkh), because if the productivity
realization is low, direct investors would sell their projects right away regardless of whether or not
they receive a liquidity shock. The market also believes that a direct investment is sold due to
low productivity with the probability
(1￿￿dk)￿dk
￿dk+(1￿￿dk)￿dk, and the productivity realization of such direct
investment is Rkl. As a result, the market perceives that the expected return of a direct investment
sold in period one is equal to
b Rdk ￿
(1 ￿ ￿dk)￿dk
￿dk + (1 ￿ ￿dk)￿dk
Rkl +
￿dk
￿dk + (1 ￿ ￿dk)￿dk
Rkh
with a variance ￿2
k.
The question is what is the value of ￿dk? Let ￿ik be the fraction of direct investors from country
i investing country k. Then the fraction of direct investors from both country A and B investing
country A is ￿k= ￿￿Ak+(1 ￿ ￿)￿Bk, so ￿dk can be calculated as
￿dk =
￿￿Ak￿A + (1 ￿ ￿)￿Bk￿B
￿￿Ak + (1 ￿ ￿)￿Bk
21On the contrary, portfolio investors do not obtain such private information about the investment
projects. Hence, portfolio investments would only be sold because of liquidity need. Thus, the
market perceives that the expected return and the variance of a portfolio investment sold in period
one is Rpk and ￿2
k=N k, respectively.
At period two, the payo⁄s of the remaining asset holdings realize, and those without liquidity
shock in period one will consume their wealth.
After solving the mean-variance utility maximization problem of both direct and portfolio investors









Substitute these solutions in the investors￿Diamond-Dybvig utility function to get the optimal
demands for direct and portfolio investments in period zero, which are the following:
xi
pk =





(Rkh ￿ 1) ￿ ￿i (Rkh ￿ pdk)
(1 ￿ ￿i)￿￿2
k
In order for both direct and portfolio investment to coexist in period one in an equilibrium, the
important property is that the optimal demands, which re￿ ect the expected utilities, of direct and
portfolio investment must be equal, or else all investor would by only a type of investment that
yields the higher expected utility. Thus,







The above property together with the market clearing condition written below will be used to
compute the prices of FDI and FPI.






￿￿Ak (￿A + (1 ￿ ￿A)￿k)xA
dk











This market clearing condition simply means that in a country k, the quantity of investment
supplied by investors with liquidity shock or with low productivity realization is equal to the
22quantity of investment demanded by those without liquidity shock.
Then, how do investors choose between direct and portfolio investment in period zero? When
deciding between a direct investment and a portfolio investment, an investor would choose a type
that yields a higher expected utility. Since it is assumed that investors from country A has lower
probability of liquidity shock (liquidity risk) than those from country B, a direct investment with
higher management e¢ ciency would be more attractive to investors from country A, ceteris paribus.
There are ￿ve possible cases of capital ￿ ows composition in equilibrium (or equilibria):
Case 1: All investors choose portfolio investment
Case 2: Some investors from A choose direct investment
All investors from B choose portfolio investment
Case 1 and 2 constitute a Type I equilibrium, which is unique due to the strategic substitutability
in becoming a direct investor. That is, there exists a unique equilibrium with the proportion of









a result, the price of direct investment declines as a fraction of direct investors increases.
Case 3: All investors from A choose direct investment
All investors from B choose portfolio investment
Case 4: All investors from A choose direct investment
Some investors from B choose portfolio investment
Case 5: All investors choose direct investment
Case 3, 4, and 5 constitute a Type II equilibrium, which could be a unique equilibrium or multiple
equilibria. There are two reasons multiple equilibria exist. On one hand (as in Type I equilibrium),
as a fraction of direct investors increases, the price of direct investment decreases, re￿ ecting strategic
substitutability. On the other hand, as there are more direct investors with higher liquidity risk,
it is more likely that a direct investment is sold due to liquidity need, improving the price of the
prematurely sold direct investment.
A this stage, the model consists of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, but no aggregate shocks. Assume
that liquidity shocks to individual investors are triggered by some country-speci￿c aggregate liq-
uidity shock. Speci￿cally, there is a probability of a country-speci￿c aggregate liquidity shock in
country A (country B). Once the shock occurs, it becomes common knowledge. Conditional on the
realization of the aggregate liquidity shock, individual investors in the country may be subject to a
need to sell their investment at period 1. With probability (1-q), an aggregate liquidity shock does
not occur. In this case individual investors do not have a liquidity need that forces them to sell at
23period 1.
This speci￿cation of the how aggregate shock triggers idiosyncratic shocks is admittedly simple.
The idea that we are trying to capture with this speci￿cation is that individual investors are forced
to sell their investments early at times when there are aggregate liquidity problems. In those
times, some individual investors have deeper pockets than others, and thus are less exposed to the
liquidity issues. Thus, once an aggregate liquidity shock occurs in country i, investors, who have
deeper pockets, are less likely to need to sell than 1- investors (i =A,B).
2410 Appendix
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Summary Statistics For Dependent Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(outward FPI / outward FDI) 1708 -0.98 1.72 -8.32 4.36
ln(outward FDI) 2199 6.44 3.39 -3.91 15.01
ln(outward FPI) 1753 6.25 3.44 -4.61 14.74
ln(inward FPI / inward FDI) 1725 -2.13 1.95 -11.47 2.89
ln(inward FDI) 2475 8.07 2.29 1.42 14.84
ln(inward FPI) 1725 6.81 3.41 -3.91 14.54
Summary Statistics For Variables of Interest
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Liquidity crisis dummy 2436 0.17 0.38 0 1
Liquidity crisis dummy*(FDI/all inward
capital)i,t-1
2235 0.16 0.35 0 1
Truncated liquidity crisis severity 2399 0.02 0.09 0 2.73
Truncated liquidity crisis severity*(FDI/all
inward capital)i,t-1
2232 0.02 0.10 0 2.73
Summary Statistics For Instruments
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Current Account Balance/GDP 2463 -2.26 6.32 -28.76 22.42
Govt. Budget Balance/GDP 1892 -0.03 0.05 -1 0.19
ICRG ￿nancial risk index 1602 35.13 8.50 10 50
ICRG political risk index 1602 67.31 14.81 27 97
Summary Statistics For Controls
Variable Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Log of GDP 1723 5.90 2.96 -4.61 14.65
Log of GDP Per Capita 1716 8.04 1.52 4.82 10.79
Log of Stock Market Capitalization 1108 -1.55 1.36 -8.46 1.57
Trade Openness 1680 4.16 0.56 2.53 5.93
Real Exchange Rate 1199 103.82 24.99 41.75 354.96
Lag of Real Exchange Rate 1189 4.63 0.22 3.73 5.87
GDP de￿ ator 1715 1517.7 14680.7 1.00E-07 314948.7


















Liquidity crisis dummy -0.1722 -0.1266 -0.0108 -0.2576 -0.2553
Liquidity crisis dummy*Initial
inward FDI portion
-0.1157 -0.0112 0.035 -0.0983 -0.1362
Truncated liquidity crisis
severity
-0.1094 -0.0655 0.0196 -0.207 -0.1958
Liquidity crisis severity*Initial
inward FDI portion
-0.1088 0.0015 0.0281 -0.1289 -0.1496
Table 3: The E⁄ect of Liquidity Crisis Probability on the FDI to FPI Price Ratio
(Fixed E⁄ects)
Severity Binary
Instrumented liquidity crisis -48.29** -5.05**
20.97 2.12
Log of GDP -0.31 -2.43
0.19 2.76




GDP de￿ator 0.010 -0.003
0.028 0.027
Numbers of observation 458 458
Numbers of countries 47 47
Underidenti￿cation test (Anderson




test of all instruments)
1.895 4.258
P-value 0.1686 0.1189
The dependent variable is the log of the price of FDI over the price of FPI. The country and time
￿xed e⁄ects are included in both equations. The italic numbers are the standard deviations.
26Table 4: The E⁄ect of Liquidity Crisis and Initial Foreign
Direct Investment Portion on the FDI Price to FPI Price Ratio
Severity Binary






Initial direct investment portion -0.57 1.53
1.83 4.11
Log of GDP -4.62*** -8.10**
1.07 2.59




GDP de￿ator 38.21*** 61.63***
11.69 23.05
Numbers of observation 356 343
Numbers of countries 40 39
Underidenti￿cation test (Anderson
canon. corr. LM statistic)
5.843 5.168
P-value 0.0538 0.0755




The dependent variable is the log of the price of FDI over the price of FPI. The country and time
￿xed e⁄ects are included in both equations. The italic numbers are the standard deviations.
27Table 5: The E⁄ect of Liquidity Crisis on the Outward FPI to FDI Ratio
Fixed E⁄ects Dynamic Panel
Severity Binary Severity Binary
Instrumented liquidity cri-
sis
17.40* 1.10* 2.30** 0.35*
8.92 0.67 0.93 0.93
Log of GDP -1.83** -1.96** -0.02* -0.02
0.93 0.79 0.01 0.01
Log of GDP per capita
(constant price)
-2.06*** -2.69*** -0.01 -0.01
0.40 0.40 0.04 0.04
Log of stock market capital-
ization
0.23*** 0.16** -0.01 -0.01
0.07 0.06 0.03 0.03
Trade openness (lag) -1.11*** -1.25*** -0.04 -0.04
0.31 0.27 0.04 0.04
Real exchange rate (lag) -2.56*** -2.28*** -0.21 -0.21















Numbers of observation 694 719 330 337















28Table 6: The E⁄ect of Liquidity Crisis Probability and the Initial
Direct Investment Portion on the Outward FPI to FDI Ratio (Fixed E⁄ects)
Severity Binary











Log of GDP -0.30*** -0.43***
0.09 0.16








Trade openness -0.69* -1.13*
0.37 0.59
Real exchange rate (lag) -0.79** -0.24
0.37 0.44
GDP de￿ator -0.004 -0.002
0.002 0.002
Numbers of observation 497 199
Numbers of countries 51 27
Underidenti￿cation test (An-





tion test of all instruments)
3.208 1.986
P-value 0.201 0.370
29Table 7: The E⁄ect of Liquidity Crisis and the Initial
Direct Investment Portion on the Outward FPI to FDI Ratio (Dynamic Panel)
Severity Binary






Initial direct investment portion 0.25 0.25
0.23 0.23
Log of GDP -0.02** -0.02*
0.01 0.01




Log of stock market capitalization 0.00 0.00
0.03 0.03
Trade openness 0.01 0.01
0.04 0.04
Real exchange rate (lag) -0.30* -0.30
0.17 0.17
GDP de￿ator -0.0009** -0.0009**
0.0004 0.0004
Lag of outward FPI to FDI ratio 0.90*** 0.90***
0.04 0.04
Numbers of observation 499 495
Numbers of countries 54 54
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 16.49 16.53
P-value 0.124 0.123
30Table 8: The E⁄ect of Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the Outward FDI
Fixed E⁄ects Dynamic Panel
Severity Binary Severity Binary
Instrumented liquidity
crisis
-19.20** -1.88** -0.67* -0.07**
9.01 0.90 0.37 0.37
Log of GDP -0.66 -0.54 0.02*** 0.02***
0.82 0.80 0.01 0.01
Log of GDP per capita
(constant price)
2.68* 2.54*** 0.06*** 0.06***
0.37 0.36 0.03 0.03
Log of stock market cap-
italization
0.04 0.11* 0.05*** 0.05***
0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02
Trade openness (lag) 0.67** 0.57** -0.09** -0.09***
0.27 0.26 0.03 0.03
Real exchange rate (lag) 1.56*** 1.04*** 0.08 0.08















Numbers of observation 760 787 394 410















31Table 9: The E⁄ect of Liquidity Crisis on the Level of the Outward FPI
Fixed E⁄ects Dynamic Panel
Severity Binary Severity Binary
Instrumented liquidity cri-
sis
-1.65 -0.05 1.36** 0.19
5.44 0.44 0.65 0.65
Log of GDP -2.21*** -
2.17***
0.00 0.00
0.57 0.55 0.01 0.01
Log of GDP per capita
(constant price)
0.62** 0.60** 0.06 0.06
0.24 0.25 0.05 0.05
Log of stock market capi-
talization
0.31*** 0.32*** 0.05 0.05
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Trade openness (lag) -0.35* -0.34* -0.14** -0.14***
0.19 0.19 0.06 0.06
Real exchange rate (lag) -0.78*** -
0.82***
-0.09 -0.09















Numbers of observation 695 696 343 343















32Table 10: The E⁄ect of Liquidity Crisis Probability on Net FDI Flows
Severity Binary









Initial direct investment portion -33375.52** -28621.34*
13974.00 14739.56
Log of GDP 4207.04** 4176.82*
2114.08 2171.34




Log of stock market capitalization 2690.32** 2434.33*
1226.05 1385.67
Trade openness (lag) -9349.85 -11804.13
8336.48 8376.37
Real exchange rate (lag) -10463.16 -13603.92*
7096.88 7211.01
GDP de￿ator -24.97 -17.51
33.15 35.47
Numbers of observation 202 202
Numbers of countries 28 28
Underidenti￿cation test









The dependent variable is the outward FDI less inward FDI. The country and time ￿xed e⁄ects are
included in both equations. The italic numbers are the standard deviations.
33Table 11: The E⁄ect of the Liquidity Crisis Probability on the Net FPI
Severity Binary








Initial direct investment portion 22368.69* 17984.77
11689.61 11575.98
Log of GDP -7123.10*** -6768.83***
1756.04 1637.61





Log of stock market capitalization 69.67 -192.38
1033.01 1101.89
Trade openness (lag) 15365.83** 14277.44**
6771.58 6320.18
Real exchange rate (lag) 2185.11 1997.11
5789.68 5549.03
GDP de￿ator 46.26* 45.54*
27.76 26.70
Numbers of observation 207 204
Numbers of countries 28 28
Underidenti￿cation test









The dependent variable is the outward FPI less inward FPI. The country and time ￿xed e⁄ects are
included in both equations. The italic numbers are the standard deviations.
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